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A B S T R A C T 
Objective: Hungary is a leading outward foreign investor among the new member 
states of the European Union. Our research question is what those factors are which 
 enabled Hungarian companies to expand abroad successfully.  
 
Research Design & Methods: Our methodology is based on company case studies of 
the   leading   investors   and   other   randomly   selected   companies   with   foreign 
 investment.   
Findings:  Our  main  findings  include  the  specific  ownership  advantages  (OA)  of 
 privatised companies, with links to their heritage from the pre-transition period.   
Implications & Recommendations: For companies established after 1990, OA is more 
similar  to  that  of  ͞traditional  multinatioŶals.͟  Second,  we  make  a  link  between 
͞ǀirtual indirect͟ investors and this specific OA, showing how the strong position and 
specific knowledge of the management are interrelated in developing and changing 
 the OA.   
Contribution & Value Added:  On  the  basis of  our research,  the policy  dimension 
concerns,  first  of  all,  the  role  of  increasing  local  competition  due  to  increased 
investments by foreign multinationals. This enables a few local companies to enhance 
their level of competitiveness to such level where they themselves will be able to 
become successful foreign investors. Second, highly innovative companies in small 
market niches are able to internationalise successfully even in the post-transition 
environment. Fostering R&D is thus an important tool for trade and investment policy 
 as well.              
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Hungary is a leading outward foreign investor among the new member states of 
the European Union. It started to invest abroad earlier than other countries of the 
region, and thus the overall stock of OFDI and per capita OFDI is usually higher than in 
other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Our study concentrates on the 
ownership advantages (OA) of these firms and the changes made to them which enabled 
them to become (regional) multinationals (MNCs). 
Our paper’s main aim is to show what factors enabled Hungarian companies to 
expand abroad successfully – and thus result in a significant stock of outward FDI at the 
macroeconomic level. Our methodology is based on company case studies of the leading 
investors and other randomly selected companies with foreign investment. The 
remaining part of the paper is organised as follows: First, we show the theoretical 
framework and a short review of the literature for our analysis. Second, we briefly 
describe the methodology used in this initial phase of the research. Third, we present the 
company  case  studies.  Fourth,  we  briefly  compare  ownership  advantages  of  our 
company cases with those of ͞traditioŶal͟ and emerging multinationals. The final section 
presents our conclusions. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
We rely on two strands of literature. First, our analysis focuses on the notion of 
ownership  advantages (OA),  which  enable  companies to invest  abroad  successfully. 
Second, we also relate our research to the literature on emerging multinational 
companies (EMNs), which delineate the distinguishing factors between ͞traditioŶal͟ and 
emerging MNCs. 
The eclectic paradigm of Dunning (1993) is a summary of theories, which builds 
partly on the theory of internalisation (Buckley & Casson, 1995) and transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1975). The three elements of the OLI-paradigm are: ownership, locational 
and internalisation advantages. These advantages explain foreign direct investments, i.e. 
for a foreign direct investment to be realised, all three of these advantages must be in 
place. The investing company must have ownership and internalisation advantages, 
while the host country must possess locational advantages. 
As some authors argue, the OLI paradigm explains the investment of multinationals 
from developed countries well, but it is less relevant in the case of EMNs (Contessi, 
2010). EMNs are very heterogeneous and do not seem to possess OA, for example, in the 
form of strong global brands. Some EMNs even have ͞adversity advantages͟: they are 
able to handle relatively disadvantageous local conditions in less developed countries 
that would otherwise scare off investors from advanced countries. On the other hand, 
certain EMNs invest abroad just to obtain OA (Aulakh, 2007; Mathews, 2006). Ramamurti 
(2012) argues that EMNs have to have OA; however, these are different from the ones of 
developed firms or ͞traditioŶal͟ MNCs. Such OA can be the understanding of emerging 
market needs, functioning in difficult circumstances, etc., which obviously differ from the
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characteristics and abilities of ͞traditioŶal͟ MNCs. Certain authors point to the fact that 
with time EMNs will develop similar OA to the developed MNCs (Lessard & Lucea, 2009). 
According to another strand of literature, firms in less developed countries may 
also have OA. The heterogeneity of firms is highly relevant in the case of EMNs. 
Productivity and efficiency can depend on the form of FDI or internationalisation (Nocke 
& Yeaple, 2008). Highly productive firms coexist with less efficient ones within one 
country. This heterogeneity is related to the comparative ownership advantage 
framework (Li Sun, Peng, Ren & Yan, 2012) that says that although country A may be less 
developed than country B, certain companies in certain industries in country A can be 
superior  in  some  fields  (design,  marketing,  research,  etc.)  to  their  counterparts  in 
country B. This can then lead to country A's firms' successful investment in the more 
developed country B. 
The  specific  nature  of  EMNs  has  led  certain  researchers  to  revise  previous 
theoretical frameworks. For example, instead of the OLI framework Matthews (2006) 
elaborates the ͞LLL framework͟ that he considers more relevant in the case of ͞DragoŶ͟ 
(i.e. Asia-Pacific) MNCs. The three letters mean Linkage (acquire resources externally), 
Leverage (exploit the resources stemming from linkages) and Learning (becoming more 
effective). 
The literature on EMNs is large, but analyses are generally made on firms in the 
BRIC countries, while MNCs originating from CEE are analysed much less often. These 
͞traŶsitioŶ country multinatioŶals͟ fit neither in the traditional theories of advanced 
MNCs, nor in the theories of EMNs. (Svetlicic, 2004) CEE countries are somewhere in 
between the developed and developing countries. The example of Hungary and 
Hungarian MNCs is a good illustration of a ͞ŵiddle-developed͟ economy and its 
companies, which invest larger and larger sums abroad. 
 
 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
In the present phase of our research, we rely on company case studies, for which the 
information is obtained from the balance sheets, websites of the companies and articles 
from specialised newspapers and journals. We selected six Hungarian-controlled 
companies which invested abroad. We tried to include companies of all sizes and firms 
from those sectors, in which significant foreign investments were realised. Of course, 
partly due to the low number of companies in the sample, it cannot be representative, 
but taken as a kind of ͞pilot͟ before conducting a research on a larger sample, it can 
provide  important  insights  regarding  our  research  question,  namely  what  factors 
enabled Hungarian companies to successfully invest abroad. 
Case studies can serve as a useful tool in the first stage of a research. They can be a 
useful tool for identifying problems and determining data needs for a statistical analysis, 
especially in the circumstances of the unreliability of macrodata and when the analysis is 
focusing on qualitative issues.. They help gain qualified knowledge for a deeper 
understanding of the analysed theory on the basis of practical cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Case studies are rich in detail and provide information on the dynamics of the analysed 
process. They can give insight into phenomena, which are seemingly unrelated to the 
analysed problems, but can prove useful in the analysis. The advantage of using multiple 
cases over one company case study is obvious. In multiple case studies there is room for
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the heterogeneity of firms and strategy, as well as for concentrating on those aspects of 
the problem, which we deem to be the most important in the given case. The case study 
approach is more flexible and thus it can grasp a wider spectrum of factors affecting the 
analysed phenomenon. We are nevertheless aware of the limits of this method. While 
they provide very valuable information on the behaviour of firms, generalisation may be 
difficult due to the small number of firms involved in the sample, compared to the 
usually large number of company data analysed in econometric studies. The collected 
material may also be biased due to the selection of companies. Overall, the 
heterogeneity of Hungarian firms investing abroad makes it useful on one hand to rely 
on this methodology, and on the other hand, to base our research on multiple case 
studies at this early stage of research. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
FDI in Hungary – Overview 
Hungarian companies started to invest abroad substantially in the mid-1990s. Since 
then, outward flows increased steadily, reaching their highest values in 2006-2007. Flows 
in the crisis years declined sharply, and then slowly reached the pre-crisis level again 
by 2012 (Figure 1). 
Pre-crisis fluctuations can be attributed to the fact that both Hungarian-based, 
formerly state-owned, but now privatised, companies and foreign-owned Hungarian 
affiliates of large MNCs started to get involved in privatisation deals in neighbouring 
countries. One or more privatisation projects push annual outflows to a higher level in 
certain years. Thus, Hungarian OFDI was closely related to privatisation deals in 
geographically close countries. During crisis years and afterwards, privatisation-related 
deals are much less significant. 
 
3500 
 
3000 
 
2500 
 
2000 
 
1500 
 
1000 
 
500
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
664 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1466 
 
856 
 
 
2923 
2643 
 
 
1874 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1337
 
0            45   3 
403 
245 235 
399 294 
433 374 459
 
 
Figure 1. Outward FDI Flows from Hungary, 1995-2012 (million EUR) 
Notes: Excluding Capital in Transit, Restructuring of asset portfolios and Special Purpose Entities 
Source: Hungarian National Bank
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Figure 2. The Sector Composition of Outward FDI Flows from Hungary, 2008 and 2012 (%) 
Source: Hungarian National Bank 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Host Country Composition of Hungarian OFDI, 2008 and 2012 (%) 
Source: Hungarian National Bank
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The sector composition of OFDI shows the dominance of a few sectors (Figure 2). While 
services OFDI initially dominated, the share of manufacturing increased gradually to 
more than one-third by 2008, declining again by 2012. Certain leading sectors can be 
connected to the activities of a few companies, as for example mining and petroleum to 
MOL, financial services to OTP and pharmaceutical products to Richter. This underlines 
the relatively high concentration of Hungarian OFDI in terms of investing companies. 
As for host countries, neighbouring and geographically close countries with which 
Hungary has had traditional economic ties (Croatia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, 
Ukraine, other former Yugoslav countries) always had a large share in Hungarian OFDI 
(Figure 3). On the other hand, countries known for their ͞taǆ optimisation faĐilities͟ 
(Cyprus, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Central America and to some extent Switzerland) 
have an increasing part lately. 
 
 
SHORT CASE STUDIES OF HUNGARIAN OUTSIDE INVESTOR COMPANIE 
1
 
 
MOL is one of the leading companies in CEE and in Europe in petrol and gas production 
and distribution, the largest Hungarian company in terms of turnover, operating profit, 
exports and foreign assets, and it is the leading one in its sector. As is often the case with 
these types of companies in the gas and oil sector, it has a monopoly in certain areas. Its 
predecessor was founded in 1938 and was nationalised in 1949. In 1957, the Hungarian 
oil industry was integrated into a single entity: Hungarian Oil & Gas Trust (OKGT), the 
largest Hungarian firm at that time. The OKGT’s privatisation process was launched in 
1991, when its legal successor, the Hungarian Oil & Gas Company Plc (MOL)’s shares 
were introduced to the Budapest Stock Exchange (in three tranches: 1994, 1995, 1997). 
In September 2013, 27.3% of the shares were held by various foreign institutional 
investors, while 24.6% were held by the Hungarian government. Other shareholders of 
above 5% are the Czech group CEZ (7.3%), OmanOil (7%), Magnolia Finance (5.7%) and 
ING Bank (5%). Thus, MOL is majority foreign-owned, but not foreign-controlled, as none 
of the foreign owners has more than 7.3% of the shares. All strategic decisions are made 
by the company’s management residing in Hungary. 
In 2013, MOL was the majority owner of 39 foreign affiliates, as a result of a 
gradual foreign expansion strategy. Its first two affiliates were established in 
neighbouring Romania and the Ukraine in 1994 through greenfield investments, followed 
by other greenfield investments in other neighbouring countries. A strategic change 
came in 2000, when MOL decided to become a leading regional MNC. Since then, 
privatisation-related acquisitions have dominated with an  increasing project size. In 
2000, the company acquired dominant ownership of Slovnaft, the leading Slovakian oil 
firm. MOL also owns 49% of the shares of the Croatian INA, the national oil company. 
Other affiliates of MOL include resource-seeking investments in Asia, the Middle East, 
and Africa, which are smaller in size and focus on exploration and production. Other 
 
 
 
1  
The case studies on MOL and OTP are the updated versions of those presented in Sass et al. (2012). The 
sources of information are company websites (www.mol.hu; www.otp.hu; www.richter.hu, www.videoton.hu, 
www.aboholding.com, www.3dhistech.com) and publicly available balance sheets of the companies, unless 
otherwise stated.
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European affiliates can be found mainly in distribution and wholesale and retail trade, 
motivated by access to the local market. (These are located, among others, in Austria, 
Germany, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia). As part of the new strategy, MOL also 
acquired a majority stake of 30% in the leading Hungarian petrochemical company TVK in 
2000, increasing it gradually to 87%. Thus, MOL’s foreign assets also increased as TVK 
itself is a foreign investor with affiliates in Italy, Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland 
and Ukraine. After becoming a regional multinational, MOL was target to unsuccessful 
hostile takeovers first by the Austrian ÖMV and later by the Russian Surgutneftegas. The 
Hungarian Government owns a voting preference share, which entitles it to veto certain 
strategic decisions, including those affecting ownership changes in the company. None of 
the shareholders or groups of shareholders may exercise voting rights of more than 10%, 
as is stated in MOL's Articles of Association. Thus, both hostile takeover attempts proved 
to be unsuccessful, but as a result, the management is trying to strengthen its position 
further, partly through additional foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments. 
The OA of MOL can be found its the knowledge of regional markets and contacts 
established in the pre-transition period. The firm has a deep knowledge of the 
privatization process and post-privatisation restructuring of formerly state-owned firms 
in CEE. However, as we could see, its foreign expansions are characterised by a defensive 
motive as well. 
The Hungarian OTP is the largest regional player in the banking sector in CEE. The 
legal predecessor of OTP, established in 1949, was a nation-wide state-owned bank 
specialised in retail banking. In 1990 it became a public company and non-banking 
activities were sectioned off. At present, OTP is Hungary’s leading bank, with an overall 
market share of more than 25%, and dominance in the retail segment. 
OTP was privatised through the stock exchange in three ͞traŶches͟ (1995, 1997 
and 1999). As a result, the state's ownership in the bank decreased to a single voting 
preference (golden) share. Currently, the bank is characterized by dispersed ownership 
of mostly private and institutional (financial) investors. As of 31st of December 2013, the 
ownership structure is as follows: 35.6% of the shares are in domestic ownership; the 
Hungarian state owns 5.1%, MOL 8.6%, and no other domestic owner has above 5%. 
64.4% of the shares are owned by foreigners in a similarly dispersed manner, with no 
controlling shareholder. None of the foreign owners has more than 9%. Thus, strategic 
decisions are made by the Hungarian management, residing in Hungary. There are no 
foreign citizens in the senior management or among the members of the Board of 
Directors. The official language of the company is Hungarian. Thus, OTP is majority 
foreign-owned, but not foreign-controlled. 
OTP is a strictly regional player; 100% of the ďaŶk’s assets are located in the CEE 
region. By the nature of its activities, all its investments can be regarded as market 
seeking. In 2002, it acquired a Slovakian bank. In 2003, a Bulgarian bank, in 2004, a 
Romanian bank, in 2005, a Croatian and a Serbian bank, in 2006, another Serbian bank 
and  entered  the  Ukrainian,  Romanian,  Russian  and  Montenegrin  banking  markets. 
More recently, in January 2014, it acquired another Croatian bank. Its entry modes 
are connected to privatisation, with the exception of the Romanian, Russian, 
Montenegrin,  Ukrainian  and  recently  acquired  Croatian  banks.  Altogether,  OTP  has
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13 million customers and 1500 bank offices in the region, and is becoming one of 
the leading regional banks. 
What is the source of OTP's OA? In the first period of its foreign acquisitions, OTP 
gained  expertise  in  transforming  a  formerly  state-owned  bank  into a bank  able  to 
operate successfully in a market economy. In that sense, the earlier privatisation of 
banks by foreigners, resulting in a competitive environment, and the earlier 
transformation of the banking system in Hungary compared to other CEE countries 
played an important role. In 2002, those countries where the bank is present were 
clearly behind Hungary in terms of the process of establishing a market economy. Later, 
when CEE countries made significant steps towards the market economy in terms of the 
regulatory system and privatisation, OTP bank had to find a new OA. This, nowadays, 
can  be  found  in  operating  successfully  in  a  post-transition  environment,  especially 
in the retail sector. 
Gedeon Richter Plc (GR) is one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in CEE
2
. 
The company was established by pharmacist Gedeon Richter in 1901. It became an 
internationally recognized major firm in the period between the First and Second World 
War. The company conducted R&D activities from the beginning, obtaining 86 patents by 
1948.  It  internationalised  early,  beginning  in  1920  through  operating  agents  and 
agencies,  ten  subsidiaries  and  40  representation  offices  abroad.  GR  was  Hungary’s 
second largest exporter before World War II, but after 1945 it lost its Western European 
export markets and subsidiaries, and was nationalized in 1948. In 1949, the COMECON
3
 
was formed and GR focused its export activities on the CEE markets, becoming the 
largest supplier of pharmaceuticals to COMECON. Since the mid-seventies, GR has 
increased exports to Western countries, and in the 1980s the company concluded R&D 
development cooperation agreements with American and Japanese firms. After the 
collapse of COMECON, Richter lost its CEE markets and had to struggle for survival even 
at home, in the post-transition business environment. The new management introduced 
a new strategy in 1992 that includes investing abroad and building an international 
network. The firm was privatised through the stock exchange in three tranches (1994, 
1995 and 1997). Currently, RG is characterized by dispersed ownership of mostly private 
and institutional investors without any investor holding a controlling share. (At present, 
25% of the shares are held by the Hungarian state, 69% by foreign (institutional and 
retail) investors, and 6% by domestic investors.) Strategic decisions are made in Hungary 
by the Hungarian management. 
GR started investing abroad after its privatisation was complete. Nowadays, it is a 
regional MNC, with production affiliates and representative offices in neighbouring and 
geographically close countries,  including Western European locations (Germany  and 
Switzerland). It also has affiliates in faraway countries (e.g. in India, China, Jamaica, 
Mexico). GR is present in 38 countries with 5 production sites, 29 representative offices 
 
 
 
2 
The case study of GR relies mainly on AntalóĐzy (2008). 
3  
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 1949–1991, was an economic organization under 
the leadership of the Soviet Union that comprised the countries of the Eastern Bloc and other socialist 
states elsewhere in the world.
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and 27 commercial subsidiaries,  and  is thus the  most geographically  „spread͟  firm 
among Hungarian investor companies. GR is a branded generic company with markets 
characterized by a very intensive (price) competition both on the domestic market and 
abroad. Its OA include the knowledge of and contacts to the region’s market (especially 
CIS, Poland and Romania), its strength in generic R&D, its good market position with 
geographic and therapeutic niches (female healthcare) and its experience, expertise and 
brand name accumulated over more than 100 years and strengthened in the region 
during the COMECON era and afterwards. 
Videoton was established in 1938. It became a major state-owned company in the 
eighties employing 18 000 people. After the collapse of its regional markets, it was 
bought by three Hungarian individuals within the framework of privatisation in 1992. 
Based on its own traditional technologies and competencies, the firm manufactures 
parts, sub-assemblies and modules in electronics, plastics and machinery. Videoton 
provides a wide variety of products for the automotive, consumer electronics, household 
appliances, IT, office equipment and telecommunication industries. As the largest 
industrial company in Hungarian private ownership, it has become a major CEE player 
and could maintain its market position. In 2013, the company employed 7052 workers; 
its consolidated revenue was 327 million EUR, two-thirds of it coming from exports, 
mainly to EU markets. Before 1998, Videoton carried out mainly assembly-type activities, 
and extended its capacity by acquisitions in other Hungarian cities. It benefitted from the 
early arrival of electronics and automotive MNCs to Hungary compared to other 
countries in the East-Central European region by becoming their supplier, and based on 
that experience, through assembling for exports. Due to the relative increase in labour 
costs in Hungary, Videoton changed its strategy afterwards. The company became a full 
contract manufacturer, offering complete end-to-end solutions, increasing to a great 
extent the engineering content of its products. Investments were made in the domestic 
company and certain labour-intensive production phases were relocated to lower- 
labour-cost Bulgaria: Videoton bought DZU AD in Stara Zagora in 1999. In 2009, Videoton 
established a manufacturing plant in the Ukraine (Mukachevo). The main motive of both 
of its foreign acquisitions was clearly efficiency-seeking, motivated by the lower labour 
costs available at the foreign locations. 
The OA of Videoton consists of accumulated expertise in the field of electronics and 
the ability and capability of vertical integration among its affiliates. Moreover, it can rely 
on its established contacts with electronics and automotive MNC affiliates in Hungary 
and abroad. Videoton could successfully change strategies and adapt itself to the 
changing features and demand of electronic industry and related services, partly helped 
by its efficiency-seeking foreign acquisitions. 
The predecessor of ABO Holding was Szabolcs Gabona Ltd., founded in 1993 by 
conglomerating former cooperatives and firms that traditionally had purchased and 
processed corn and grain. Apart from mills, flour, and cereals, ABO Holding has poultry 
and pork farms. Thus, it operates in a sector where Hungary traditionally had 
comparative advantages, and where competition in Hungary is intense. It is owned by 
Hungarian private persons, and it was thoroughly reformed in 2005 when the present 
name was introduced. Domestic and foreign market presence was increased by 
acquisitions and developments: the firm invested in neighbouring Slovakia, the Ukraine
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and Romania. The main motivation of investment was market access, but to a certain 
extent increasing efficiency through lower labour costs was also an aim. In 2007 and 
2008, ABO invested about 1 billion HUF in development and innovation on bio food base 
materials and an increase of poultry and pork capacities in Romania. 
The crisis hit ABO Holding severely, resulting in huge losses and, consequently, 
liquidation proceedings. Apart from the crisis, the abolition of EU and state subsidies on 
chickens beginning in 2010 and the decrease of meat prices caused severe difficulties. 
From 2010, ABO rationalised its activity, merged production capacities and liquidated 
loss-making   parts.   Abofarm   (chicken)   in   Romanian   locations   had   to   decrease 
employment to one third. The company sold and let out firŵs’ premises and machines 
that were not used. The main OA of ABO Holding is that it had skill, experience and 
knowledge regarding corn and grain processing and gained considerable experience early 
on with the market economy transformation of the sector. Up until the crisis, it also 
enjoyed favourable credit facilities and conditions at home. 
3D Histech is at present a medium-sized company with 72 employees. It was 
established in 1997, though the year of formal establishment dates back to 1991, when it 
started its activities with three employers, i.e. as a micro company. However, at that 
time the company’s main activity was wholesale and retail trade, while after a change in 
ownership in 1997 it has dealt with the development and production of digital slide 
scanners (virtual microscopy), including both hardware and software production. This 
change in activity was the result of a spin-off type development: the owner, himself a 
physician working at a university, elaborated the technology for producing the product. 
The strong traditions of Hungary in the medical precision instruments sector and the 
strong international cooperation in R&D activity at universities both helped that 
development. The company grew relatively quickly after changing its product portfolio, 
though at the end of the nineties it had problems with financing its activities. As the 
owner put it: ͞…at that time we were knocking on the door of venture capital providers 
in vain – now we are the ones who do not want any money from theŵ.͟ The company 
internationalised very soon after its establishment in 1997: the share of exports in total 
sales by 2000 reached 90%, while at present it is 97%. The company exports both inside 
and outside the European Union. At present, it sells more than 60 digital slide scanners 
annually all over the world. In 2013, it won the prize of the innovation exporter of the 
year award from the Hungarian Investment and Trade Agenc 
4
. Already in 2000, the firm 
established a representative office in the United States. The main reason for this was, 
first, the company wanted to be present close to the ͞kŶoǁledge͟ centre in its field, 
second, to be close to one of its important markets. 
The OA of the company is its innovativeness. It came up with a real novelty even on 
a worldwide scale, and it is now leader in the digital pathology market. The owner is a 
trained physician, who once said that the idea of the innovation occurred to him during 
the  dull  and  cumbersome  pathology  training  in  the  university.  The  quality  of  the 
products is secured partly through the innovative techniques and technology, partly 
 
 
 
 
4 
http://www.mkik.hu/en/magyar-kereskedelmi-es-iparkamara/cikkek/exporters-of-the-year-awards-2013- 
handed-over-66399
575
7 | 
Katalin Antalóczy, Andrea Éltető, Magdolna Sass Outward FDI from Hungary – the Emergence of Hungarian Multinationals | 
575
7 
 
 
 
S 
 
 
through the use of high quality inputs imported from Japan and the U 
5
. The product is 
thus made up of high tech components and supplemented with specifically developed 
software. The company can be considered a ͞ďorŶ global,͟ as it internationalised both 
through exporting and through investing abroad very soon after its establishment. 
 
 
HUNGARIAN OUTWARD INVESTORS – COMPARISON WITH 
͞TRADITIONAL͟ AND ͞EMERGING͟ MNCS 
 
Our results can only be considered preliminary due to the research method applied. 
Because of the limited number of company case studies, we cannot generalise our 
findings; however, regarding the relatively scarce research efforts in the field, our results 
can be a basis for further research. 
First, we should state that according to estimations our company sample, 
containing six cases, represents the dominant part of Hungarian investment value 
abroad. (e.g. Sass & Kalotay, 2011). MOL and OTP are the two leading foreign investors, 
Richter  is  estimated  to  be  third,  and  Videoton  fourth  (Sass  &  Kovács,  2013).  Our 
company case studies provide insight into the nature and developments of OA of the 
analysed Hungarian MNCs. On the basis of their OA, we can distinguish two groups of 
companies in our sample. In the first group, there are firms which ͞iŶherited͟ their OA 
from the pre-transition period. Their OA is specific: it is highly related to their knowledge 
about privatisation and about the restructuring of formerly state-owned companies 
acquired in the countries of the wider region: CEE and SEE. Moreover, personal and 
business contacts established in the pre-transition era also play a role. 
However, the importance of this OA fades significantly over time partly due to the 
͞ruŶŶing out͟ of privatisation deals, partly due to the advancement of the countries in 
the region in establishing a market economy, partly due to the gradual loss of personal 
contacts inherited from the pre-transition era. When this inherited OA partly disappears, 
usually the firms in question change strategies, and together with that there is a change 
in their OA as well. This is most obvious in the case of OTP and RG, where the new OA 
can be found in concentrating on a specific market segment where the firm develops 
efficient management skills and knowledge. This new OA enables these companies to be 
competitive in new markets as well, and thus venture further away from their 
neighbouring region with market access investments, as was the case with RG. The case 
of MOL is similar, where the change of strategy consisted in changing the targets of 
foreign acquisition from downstream to upstream segments. In the case of Videoton, 
foreign acquisitions are part of the new strategy, which involves acquiring production 
units in neighbouring countries with lower labour costs, i.e. with an efficiency-seeking 
motive. Thus, on the basis of our sample, a dynamic analysis of OA in the case of 
Hungarian MNCs shows that when the initial, inherited OA of formerly state-owned firms 
expires, they are capable of changing it into a new type of OA, enabling them to continue 
their expansion abroad successfully. This dynamism can be related to the analysis of 
 
 
 
 
5 
Source of the information is an interview with the owner of the company, which was prepared in 2009 (Sass, 
2012).
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Lessard & Lucea (2009), who underline that EMNs are able increase and change their 
OA – as may be the case for all MNCs, actually. 
It is important to delineate the specific type of OA these companies have in the first 
stage of their expansion. In the traditional meaning (Dunning 1993), OA usually consists 
of highly developed technology or globally (or at least regionally) recognised brands. In 
the case of EMNs, we cannot find this type of OA, while obviously, other OAs are present 
(Ramamurti, 2012), such as the ability to function in a difficult business environment, the 
ability to understand customer needs in specific markets, etc. In our investigation, we 
kept in mind the following statement from Ramamurti (2012, p. 42): ͞We need to 
understand better which advantages can help with successful internationalisation, which 
ones cannot and why.͟ In the case of the top two Hungarian MNCs, we identified a very 
specific OA, which enabled and helped their foreign expansion: their experience with 
privatisation in a post-transition environment in the former socialist countries of CEE and 
South-East Europe (SEE), and the subsequent restructuring of the acquired company (or 
bank in the case of OTP). This finding is supported by the fact that in the first stage of 
their internationalisation, these compaŶies’ entry mode was predominantly based on 
acquisition in the framework of privatisation. Moreover, for almost all companies in the 
sample (the exception is 3DHistech), we assume that management abilities and the 
knowledge for successful operations in a post-transition business environment, where 
market forces are not fully influential, also form part of OA. 
The second type of OA in smaller sized MNCs (ABO and 3DHistech) established in 
the post-transition era are more similar to those of developed country MNCs (Dunning 
1993). ABO operates in a sector in which Hungary has traditionally had a comparative 
advantage over other countries in the region. 3DHistech relies on its innovations. Both of 
them internationalised relatively early after their establishment. 
In  our  small  sample  we  could  not  find  evidence  of  foreign  companies  being 
acquired in developed countries in order to acquire OA, as it is shown in the case of 
certain EMNs (e.g. Mathews, 2002). In the case of the two highly innovative companies 
in our sample: RG and 3DHistech, they have their own resources to be innovative. 
Moreover, they operate in highly innovative sectors; thus, being innovative, carrying out 
R&D,  and  registering  patents is  their  normal  modus  operandi.  Their  acquisitions  in 
developed countries have aims, which may be related to market-seeking and strategic 
asset-seeking motives (in the case of RG), as well as being closer to the ͞kŶoǁledge 
ĐeŶtre͟ of their sectors (in the case of 3DHistech). 
Our second finding relates these OAs with the notion of ͞virtual indirect͟ investor 
companies, which we first introduced in the literature and described in Sass et al. (2011). 
Three companies in our sample, MOL, OTP and RG are all majority foreign-owned, but 
not foreign-controlled. They all were privatised in the Budapest stock exchange in 
tranches, which resulted in a dispersed majority foreign ownership, where there is no 
foreign owner with above 10% shares (or votes). According to the literature, they are 
considered to be indirect investors as they are majority foreign-owned (e.g. Rugraff 
2010),  however,  we  would  rather  call  them  ͞ǀirtual  indirect,͟  as  many  of  their 
characteristics are much closer to direct than to indirect investors. The main reason is 
that in our understanding, majority foreign ownership is not necessarily equal to foreign 
control. In the case of our three companies, their majority foreign ownership coexists
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with a domestic control, where the Hungarian management or the domestic Hungarian 
controlling owners residing in Hungary make all decisions of strategic importance. In that 
respect, the OAs of the companies in question and the changes in their OA are connected 
to this special situation in their ownership and management. We could see that these 
companies were already important and successful market players in the pre-transition 
era with a strong management. Through the method of privatisation the management of 
these companies obtained a strong position in the company, where there were and are 
no controlling owners. On the other hand, their early privatisation (compared to their 
counterparts in other former socialist countries) provided an invaluable asset for them in 
terms of gaining knowledge about privatisation and the post-privatisation restructuring 
of state-owned enterprises and banks, on which they could later build their foreign 
expansion. Moreover, the foreign expansion of these companies also served strategic 
purposes for the management: it could strengthen their position and the market position 
of their respective companies as well. The strength of the management is manifested in 
their ability to change their OA, when the previous one could no longer serve as a basis 
for their foreign expansion. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Hungary is one of the leading outward investors in the CEE region, breeding a relatively 
large number of indigenous MNCs. In our paper, we analysed the ownership advantages 
of Hungarian MNCs, which enabled them to expand abroad successfully. We relied on six 
company case studies, including the leading Hungarian investor firms as well as smaller 
sized foreign investors. We showed the process through which these companies have 
developed and changed their OA, through reliance on which they could become 
successful outward investors. In the case of privatised firms, this has specific links to 
their pre-transition period heritage, while in the case of ͞ǀirtual indirect iŶǀestors͟ it is 
linked to the strategy of the management, and thus represents a special type of OA, 
which may be characteristic of formerly state-owned, large companies in post-transition 
countries. In that sense, their specific OA, at least in the first phase of their outward 
expansion, is more similar to that of emerging multinationals. For companies established 
after 1990, OA is more similar to that of ͞traditioŶal ŵultiŶatioŶals.͟ We emphasized the 
dynamism of OA, with constant changes when the actual OA is no longer able to provide 
a basis for successful foreign expansion and thus the company needs to modify it or 
change it completely. We showed that for ͞ǀirtual indirect͟ investors, this change 
resulted in an OA which is now more similar to that of ͞traditional multiŶatioŶals.͟ This 
was especially true for the pharmaceutical company, Richter Gedeon, and to a lesser 
extent for the other two ͞ǀirtual indirect investors,͟ MOL, and especially OTP. 
As for future research, our paper forms a basis for carrying out an analysis first, of a 
larger sample of Hungarian outward investor firms, and second, of companies from other 
former transition economies. The notion of ͞ǀirtual indirect iŶǀestors͟ especially should 
be studied checked in other post-transition economies, as it may be a specifically 
Hungarian phenomenon due to the special timing and method used for privatisation in 
our country. Moreover, the initial nature, present state, and dynamic change in-between 
these two in the OA of foreign investor companies from other post-transition countries
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should be added in order to show whether the heritage from the pre-transition period 
influenced and/or still influences the nature of their OA. 
On the basis of our research, the policy dimension concerns, first of all, the role of 
increasing local competition due to increased investments by foreign multinationals. This 
enables a few local companies to enhance their level of competitiveness to such level 
where they themselves will be able to become successful foreign investors. Second, 
highly innovative companies in small market niches are able to internationalise 
successfully even in the post-transition environment. Fostering R&D is thus an important 
tool for trade and investment policy as well. 
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